in Turkish society during this inaugural experiment with multiparty democracy.
Ecevit's contention was that Turkey's future depended in significant ways upon a revolution in the popular appreciation of art and upon individuals' contributions to a national cultural sphere free from the involvement of the state. His columns took up two of the period's most pressing questions: the extent to which the state should control the local art world, and the ways in which Turkey's newly enfranchised citizens might enact their individual rights within the realm of culture.
1
With the historic elections of 1950, a newly formed opposition party called the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) took its place at the nation's helm. Local intellectuals, many of whom had grown accustomed to the single-party state's demand that Turkish art serve its official secularist agenda, greeted the new administration with cautious optimism. Over the next ten years, the Democrat Party fluctuated dramatically in its policies toward the arts. Although they began their tenure by granting unprecedented freedoms of the press and easing the state's heavyhanded involvement in the art world, the Democrats soon showed a predilection for intimidation and censorship: the violent antiminority pogroms that took place in Istanbul in September 1955 were a shocking manifestation of state-sanctioned violence in the country's cultural capital, and ushered in a new era of repressions.
2 In the weeks following, countless newspapers were temporarily shut down, including Ulus, where Ecevit was a columnist. The Democrats remained in power for another half-decade before they were overthrown in a violent military coup in 1960. Thus, as Ecevit's writings powerfully demonstrate, contentions during this period over the waning "health" of the local art world, and discussions about individual and state involvement in the arts, were inseparable from debates about the changing status of Turkish democracy. The events of September 6-7, 1955, were two days of antiminority violence inflicted upon the sizable Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities of Istanbul. Although the government claimed that the pogroms were a spontaneous reaction to the recent bombing of Atatürk's childhood home in Thessaloniki (Greece), the administration in fact played a supporting role.
During the waning years of the Ottoman Empire and early years of the Republic, Turkish artists were eager to develop a modern artistic tradition that synthesized European aesthetic strategies and what they saw as distinctly Turkish concerns. In the early 20th century, a group of artists collectively known as the "1914 Generation"-so-called because they returned from their studies in Paris at the outbreak of World War I-used Impressionist strategies to represent iconic (Ottoman) Turkish landscapes and domestic scenes. In the 1930s and 1940s, artists such as Bedri Rahmi Eyüboglu and the other members of the loosely affiliated "D Group" (D Grubu) brought Cubist idioms to bear upon the new category of "national art" (milli sanat). By the 1950s, Turkish modernism was colored by international Cold War discourses that portrayed the world as locked in a struggle between free democratic nations and totalitarian regimes. Turkey began receiving Marshall Plan monies in 1947: during what came to be known as its "American decade," the country underwent large-scale political and economic changes designed to align it with Western liberal democracies.
3 The local intelligentsia was also sensitive to the fact that the major international powers saw Turkey as a battleground between Western democracies and the Stalinist regime in neighboring Soviet Russia. Against this backdrop, a flourishing national cultural life was seen as both a crucial way to measure what was commonly dubbed the "level of democracy" (demokrasi seviyesi) in Turkey, and a means to ensure democracy's fragile hold in this strategically located young nation. Like many of his peers, Ecevit sought to integrate the ideals of Western liberal democracy into the Turkish cultural sphere, placing particular emphasis on the idea that only as individual citizens made use of their democratic right to contestation and dissent would democracy firmly root itself and thrive. The three articles reprinted here are composed in Ecevit's signature style, in which short, polemic sentences build to a forceful final paragraph. Nonetheless, they represent the writer in three distinct journalistic modes. "The Artist and Politics" (1954) takes a broad view of the structure and functions of democracy in Turkey, mapping out existing relationships between the state and its citizens in a country that Ecevit describes as having "only recently passed through democracy's gates." "Artistic Awakening in Ankara" (1953) is a more straightforwardly journalistic piece, documenting a series of contemporaneous art world events that seem to anticipate and complement the theoretical armature of "The Artist and Politics." Finally, "The Burden of the Intellectual" (1956) is a modern parable in which Ecevit describes an imagined encounter between two citizens in order to drive home a lesson regarding the necessity for an intellectual class to espouse an empathetic, nonelitist model of citizenship in order for Turkish democracy to function properly. than 100 exhibition reviews and critiques of the Turkish art world. The young journalist also used his column to promote his own art galleryin fact, only the second art gallery established in Turkey-called the Helikon Association Gallery (Helikon Derneg i Galerisi), which he cofounded with a group of like-minded friends in 1952.
6 Helikon was named after the mountaintop where the muses of Greek myth made their home, designating the gallery as a site of creative inspiration for multiple art forms. Like its Istanbul-based precursor, Galeri Maya (established in 1950), Helikon was a privately run space whose founders conceived of its mission primarily as a public service (kamu hizmeti) rather than as a means to achieve commercial profit. (The logic here was that exposing unschooled audiences to avant-garde art forms would advance the cultural sophistication of the nation at large.) Finally, in 1954 Ecevit cofounded Forum, a trailblazing political journal that sought to embody the spirit of multiparty democracy by accommodating differing political views rather than adhering to the partisan model then dominating the Turkish press. 7 While Forum was only active until 1960, its unexpected success, like that of Helikon, was widely seen as an indication of the pressing need for new approaches to civic debate. In short, following the political changes of 1950, Ecevit positioned both his written criticism and his newly founded art space as enclaves for the continuation of the progressive social and political modernization project of the early Turkish Republic, and as sites for its critique, reinterpretation, and reinvigoration. Following his official entrance into Turkish politics as a member of parliament in 1957, Ecevit's rise While the collaborative nature of Helikon's activities makes it difficult to assign specific roles, key supporters included Selma Arel and Bülent Arel (later a founding figure in electronic music who worked at the Columbia-Princeton Electronic Music Center), Zerrin and Rasin Arsebük, and Bülent and Rahşan Ecevit. 7
Diren Çakmak, Forum Dergisi: 1954 -1960 [Forum Magazine: 1954 -1960 (Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2010).
through the ranks of the Republican Peoples' Party (or RPP, Atatürk's original party) was rapid: after a period as Minister of Labor in the 1960s, Ecevit became leader of the RPP in 1972 and served as prime minister three times during the following decade. Much of Ecevit's success in the 1960s and 70s was based on his efforts to rebrand the RPP as "left of center" (ortanın solu) and to propel the party away from its domineering paternalistic approach of tending over the masses and toward a program intended to enable more popular participation-a populist politics with which he had begun to experiment through his "tripod" of activities at Ulus, Helikon, and Forum.
8
LiberaL individuaLism and the turkish CuLturaL sphere "The Artist and Politics" argues that members of Turkish society, and artists above all others, must demand the government's recognition of their individuality as freethinking citizens rather than unthinkingly adhering to a nationalist ideology handed down by a ministering elite. This is, essentially, an argument for more extensive popular participation in Turkey's public life-the very phenomenon that had been so celebrated during the 1950 election that brought the Democrats to power, when Turkey's voters participated at a staggering rate of ninety percent. 9 Ecevit suggested that democracy would only be able to thrive in Turkey if its "local citizens" continued the trajectory begun with the granting of a vote under the multiparty system, by demanding acknowledgment of "people's individuality and personhood" [insanların bireylig i (ferdiyeti) ve kis şilig i]. Crucially, Ecevit assigned the work of demanding due recognition of the individual to artists: as he argued in "The Artist and Politics," it was "writers, and in the broadest sense artists" who conducted the deepest investigations of individual consciousness. Such was the importance of the artist's role in Ecevit's theory that he went so far as to claim that "there can be no democracy in countries where the artist is not actively involved in politics." What is more, he contended, it was precisely the ability to understand "Humanity in the abstract sense" that distinguished free democracies from totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Ecevit's argument for the artist's vanguard role in society intersected directly with the emergent discussions around political liberalism in which he was involved at Forum. Citing British and American liberal democracies as their ideal, the Forum thinkers associated several principles with liberalism, including tolerance, freedom of thought, and the importance of a free press. (The journal's title was intended to simultaneously invoke the origins of democracy in the ancient world and the open sphere of debate that the journal's founders saw as being provided by the Western press.) Above all else, Ecevit and his Forum collaborators saw Britain and the United States as exemplifying the key principle that "ideas [must be] openly shared and debated" ( fikirlerin serbestçe söylenmesi ve tartıs şılması) in order to "establish a stable armature for freedom in our country" (memleketimizde kararlıklı bir hürriyet düzeni kurulabilmesi için).
10 At a juncture when American liberalism was closely associated with the capitalist but still left-wing policies of the American Democratic Party, individuals such as Ecevit approvingly identified with such "liberal" principles in order to indicate that they were prodemocracy and pro-freedom. Thus, in asserting in "The Artist and Politics" that "there can be no democracy in countries where the artist is not actively involved in politics," the poet-politician sought to articulate an integral role for the arts within an ideal civic order that he and his peers theorized through a concept of "liberalism"-a concept that they were in the very process of defining in Turkey for the first time.
11
ChaLLenging OffiCiaLdOm: independent arts initiatives Of the 1950s
In contrast to the theoretical formulations of "The Artist and Politics," "Artistic Awakening in Ankara" documents several concrete ways that a Because Turkey decisively transitioned to a free market economy in the 1980s, the terms "liberal" and "liberalization" have developed a close association with the post-1980s period. However, one of the most significant factors shaping the 1950s was the Democrat Party's unprecedented pursuit of economic liberalization as an integral part of Turkey's post-WWII rapprochement with the United States. Thus, the concepts were already in circulation during this early phase, and even those who articulated their own positions in explicit opposition to the Democrats, such as Ecevit, made appeals to what they identified as "liberal" principles.
local intelligentsia responded to the question of how Turkish citizens might enact their individual liberties within the realm of culture. The column describes a local art world divided in two. In Ecevit's portrayal, agents of the state, on the one hand, advocate conservative aesthetic modes, exhibition formats, and patterns of consumption; on the other, upstart young art lovers engage in unprecedented forms of selforganization and consumption that reflect a commitment to the liberal principles of "individuality and personhood." The object of Ecevit's critique was what he called "officialdom" at large, with its conservative preference for klasik painting (an innocuous realism, primarily landscapes and still lifes, promoted by the yearly State Painting and Sculpture Exhibitions). Against officialdom Ecevit pitted an emergent "intellectual youth" who, he noted happily, supported "today's advanced art movements," such as abstract painting and twelve-tone music. Indeed, Ecevit's broader critical lexicon was structured around these opposing categories. On the one side stood a host of terms associated with officialdom (resmî) in its broadest sense: entities such as official authorities (resmi makamlar), statesmen (devlet adamları), and wardens of the state (devlet korucuyuları). On the other side of this conceptual field stood notions of individuality and individual consciousness: individuality (bireylik and s şahsiyet), personhood (ferdiyet and kis şilik), a psychological world or universe (psikolojik alemi), and the interior depths of the soul (ruh derinligi). In "The Artist and Politics," for example, the thickly layered phrase insanların bireyligi (ferdiyeti) ve kis şiligi-which translates literally to "people's individuality (individuality) and personhood"-includes no fewer than four terms invoking the singular being of the individual citizen. "Artistic Awakening in Ankara" provides a valuable historical record of an energetic but short-lived surge in independent initiatives that took place immediately after the Democrat Party's arrival to power in Turkey. Ecevit cataloged not only the activities of his own galeri, but also an exhibition program at Ankara University and an organization called the Ankara Law Employees Intellectual Society (Ankara Hukuk Mensupları Fikir Kulübü) .
12 This shared impulse toward The very artistic forms that Helikon supported-primarily soyut sanat or "abstract art"-marked it as an enclave for artists who challenged these long-standing ideological imperatives. Soyut sanat was a loose set of practices based in the shared formal impulse to break away, to varying extents, from painting's allegiance to a recognizable referent. It gained prevalence in Turkey in the late 1940s and quickly became the center of the defining artistic debate of the 1950s.
15 Such practices were considered by many as a form of creative expression that successfully evaded traditional state control because of its absence of identifiable "content." It also posed a direct challenge to the enduring paradigm of klasik painting. Finally, at a moment when international discourse increasingly linked formal abstraction with advanced forms of democracy, critics like Ecevit were instrumental in spreading the idea that abstraction's emphasis on individual consciousness promoted democratic civic participation.
16
Ecevit credited these unprecedented arts organizations with generating an intellectual community that actively realized the ideal social order that he theorized in "The Artist and Politics." As he put it, "perhaps the best aspect of the new artistic awakening in Ankara is that it is an awakening unconnected to state support. No longer overshadowed, the intellectual community in Ankara has blossomed to the extent that it no longer needs other sources of benefaction." Importantly, with the question of "benefaction," Ecevit also incorporates an additional dimension-the economic-into his larger argument that the nation's future as a democracy is reliant upon a shift to a participatory model of society. In "Artistic Awakening," he reframes the dichotomy of the individual versus the state as a question of patronage, announcing confidently that "it used to be that the state was the most reliable patron of art exhibitions," but that "now, individuals' gradually increasing interest fills in the void left by state support." Crucial here is Ecevit's argument that one of the ways Turkey's citizens are asserting their "individuality and personhood" in the art world is by buying things. This, he argues, is the healthiest way for the cultural sphere to function because it evades the pressures of a state ideological program, and "modern art receives support in the most salubrious way." In "Artistic Awakening in Ankara," the capitalist market appears as a free democratic zone of consumption where the previously disenfranchised Turkish masses can use their purchasing power to shape the future of the nation-voting with their wallets, so to speak. It is important to note the utopianism of these early Cold War claims for capitalism's role in securing Turkish democracy, and that such claims are above all else a consequence of his effort to articulate political alternatives to totalitarianism. Ecevit was writing in the context of dramatically changed economic conditions engineered by the Democrats in 1950, when they stimulated a seemingly miraculous (although shortlived) turnaround in the failing, state-controlled national economy by opening it up to private and foreign investment.
17 This was also a central way that Turkey gained entry to an international community of capitalist democracies as it entered its own "American decade." In "Artistic Awakening," Ecevit, who routinely described his gallery as "the site of painting's best sales" or "record-breaking sales," positioned Helikon as a successful microcosm of this newly open and privatized national economy, where Turkish citizens could enact social change by exerting their individual purchasing power. Thus, art sales were an auspicious sign of an "awakening unconnected to state support," and an upswing in consumption could stand as a symbol of popular empowerment. Even as he positioned Helikon as a space of independent activity that resisted the involvement of the state, Ecevit suggested that societal change would come about through the distribution of artworks enabled by the new liberal economic policies that the Democrat Party had enacted.
bearing the "burden Of the inteLLeCtuaL"
While arts initiatives of the 1950s rarely came under direct attack, they certainly occupied a vulnerable position within the broader cultural sphere. During the tumultuous antiminority events of September 1955, 18 for example, the fact that Helikon's name referenced Greek mythology was seen as justification enough for the government to temporarily shut it down. Although the space briefly recommenced its activities, its founders dispersed by 1956. It was apparent by this point that many of the democratic promises of the early 1950s had already begun to dissolve, and perhaps now were out of reach entirely. Ecevit soon abandoned the arts-related pursuits that he had once described as his "main field of interest" and commenced his political career. If this choice seems to signal a certain disillusionment, Ecevit was far from alone: intellectuals across the country publicly debated how "to more effectively oppose the steps the government has already taken to do away with Turkish intellectual life."
19
Such were the conditions in which Ecevit penned "The Burden of the Intellectual" (1956) , in which the young writer used the imagined scenario of a conversation between strangers to evaluate the ways in which Turkey's intelligentsia (aydınlar) had contributed to the country's recent experiment with multiparty democracy. His conclusions were damning. The column takes the form of an imaginary encounter on a public bus between a hostile member of the elite and an impoverished, uneducated member of the halk (people, or masses). Ecevit begins by introducing a typical member of the Turkish intelligentsia who sneers at a shabby fellow bus-rider, identifying him as the source of the failure of Turkish democracy: "'There you have it,' he'll say, 'that man sitting across from us is our destiny. If democracy is brought to a country where eighty percent of the population are illiterate, that's exactly what our country will look like!'" The scene provides a starting point from which Ecevit launches his own attack on the haughty bus-rider. He quickly advances a short series of arguments regarding the proper role of the "intellectual minority" (aydınlık azınlıgı) in democratic societies, in order to lay the ground for the column's final, decisive lines where he subjects the contemptuous intellectual to his very own critique: "If democracy is brought to a country where eighty percent of the intelligentsia are either haughty and spineless, lazy and dyspeptic, or fearful and lacking in belief, this is what our country will become!" By the scene's close, the reader is meant to understand that it is in fact they, the members of the intelligentsia unable to tolerate the democratic participation of all members of Turkish society, who should be held responsible for misdirecting the country's future. Ecevit advanced an energetic argument for social responsibility at a moment when, it seemed, the administration and the intelligentsia alike were ready to abandon such principles. The new atmosphere of popular empowerment of the 1950s was not an entirely comfortable reality for the urban elite who had spent the past few decades ministering the rural masses. The fact that the more than four million citizens who voted for the Democrats in 1950-a majority of them from the country's rural regions-chose to unseat the very leaders who had first introduced them to the elementary principles of democracy under the single-party system was seen as a potent symbol of the will of the halk fully at work. Suddenly the halk took on a new dimension: no longer merely ignorant masses needing to be schooled in the ways of modern life, they now appeared as active political citizens who knew full well how to use their votes. Local intellectuals were thus powerfully aware that republican top-down approaches to the halk threatened the principles of democracy itself. They believed deeply that Turkey's future lay in its ability to function as a democratic, egalitarian country, and craved the legitimacy this offered internationally. Yet the intelligentsia also feared that if it did not properly direct the cultural education of an unenlightened majority, the halk's actions might stand in the way of Turkey's quest for international respect.
The imperative to abandon such fears, to leave behind "the pridefulness and feelings of superiority" and to instead adopt a stance of "humility" (alçakgönüllük)-this was the burden of the intellectual. Such humility, explained Ecevit, would mean that rather than con-demning the poor and uneducated, Turkey's intellectuals would instead adopt an empathetic stance, would not only "heed the concerns of the majority" but would also "interest themselves in their concerns." The article's final lines serve as a rallying cry, as Ecevit exhorts his fellow thinkers not to take the path of those who are "lazy and dyspeptic, fearful and lacking in belief," but instead to actively intervene in the changing social and political order of their country. It is here that the stakes of Ecevit's broader efforts across his writings, his work as a gallerist, and his political career become clear-nothing less than the success or failure of Turkish democracy itself.
